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1. Introduction 
 
In this book I provide an account of the nature of goodness and value. According to the view that 
I motivate and defend, what it is for something to be good or valuable is just for there to be 
reasons for us to have positive attitudes towards that thing. What it is to be a good place to take a 
holiday is just to be a place that there are reasons to want to go on holiday to, to wish that one 
could take a holiday to, and to recommend to others who want to take a holiday. What it is for it 
to be good if we found a cure for cancer is just for there to be reasons for us to hope that we find 
a cure for cancer and to encourage research to find a cure. What it is for pleasure and friendship 
to be valuable is just for there to be reasons for us to want pleasure and friendship. And what it is 
for equality and liberty to be values is just for there to be reasons to desire, preserve, and promote 
liberty and equality.  
 
Further facts make it the case that it would be good if we found a cure for cancer and that 
particular holiday resorts are good ones. A holiday resort might be a good one because of its 
stunning views, sandy beaches, quiet rooms, and tasty restaurants. And it would be good if we 
found a cure for cancer because of the lives this would save, the suffering this would avert, and 
the pleasure and well-being this would promote. But these facts about the particular ways in which 
these things are good are just the facts that are reasons to have pro-attitudes towards these things. 
For instance, the resort’s stunning views and sandy beaches both make it a good resort and are the 
reasons to have pro-attitudes towards the resort. According to the view that I will motivate and 
defend in this book, the resort’s being a good one just consists in its having other features that 
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give us reasons to have pro-attitudes towards it. Following T.M. Scanlon, I’ll call the view I defend 
the buck-passing account of value.1  
 
The buck-passing account is not a substantive account of what things are good. So, it does 
not entail, or rule out, that happiness or desire-satisfaction is the only thing that is intrinsically 
good, or that a variety of things such as friendship, beauty, autonomy, and virtue are good for their 
own sake. Nor is the buck-passing account a view about whether facts about goodness and value 
are irreducibly normative or are in fact reducible to natural facts. So, the buck-passing account 
does not entail, nor rule out, that facts about goodness and value are facts about social conventions 
or that goodness or value is subjective in some other sense such as being just a matter of the norms 
that we accept. And similarly, the buck-passing account does not entail, nor rule out, that facts 
about goodness and value are facts that are more objective than this and outstrip facts about the 
attitudes that we actually have or would have in certain hypothetical circumstances.  
 
                                                 
1 See Scanlon (1998, p. 97). Scanlon calls this account a buck-passing account because one of the intuitions 
that leads him to it is the intuition that goodness and value never provide reasons to have a pro-attitude 
towards anything; it is not the resort’s goodness but its other features (its stunning views and sandy beaches) 
that are reasons to have pro-attitudes towards it (see §1.3 and §4.2 below). So, the ‘normative reason-
providing buck’ is passed from goodness to other properties; see ibid. I use the buck-passing name because 
it is now firmly associated with the view that facts about value are just facts about reasons for pro-attitudes. 
And because, as I explain in §11, I believe that reasons are more fundamental and that we can extend the 
buck-passing account to provide an account of all of practical normativity in terms of reasons. So, it would 
be confusing for me to use the other name that accounts of value in terms of reasons in the literature are 
sometimes referred to by, the ‘fitting-attitude accounts of value’.  
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The buck-passing account is instead an account of what we’re talking about when we talk 
about something being good or valuable.2 It is an account of the property that we are claiming that 
friendship has when we claim that friendship is good. And the property that we claim that equality 
has when we claim that it is a value. It is an account of what it is that hedonists and their opponents 
disagree about.  
 
Many philosophers (including Kant, Rawls, Sidgwick, Brentano, Parfit, and Scanlon) have 
defended something like the buck-passing account.3 But very little has been done to explain why 
we should accept the buck-passing account over the views with which it competes.4 And responses 
to many of the objections that have been made to the account have not been provided. In this 
book I give the first comprehensive motivation and defence of the buck-passing account of value. 
And I also explain how it can be extended to provide an explanatorily fruitful and compelling 
account of morality and all of practical normativity in terms of normative reasons.  
 
                                                 
2 This might suggest that the buck-passing account is a conceptual or semantic thesis. For a discussion of 
whether the buck-passing account is such a thesis see §1.5.2 below. But if the buck-passing account should 
be understood as only an account of the property of being good, then we can still say that the account is 
an account of the property that we’re talking about when we talk about something being good.  
3 See Kant (1996/1785, 4:413), Sidgwick (1981, pp. 109-112), Brentano (1969, p. 18), Frankena (1942, p. 
100), Ewing (1947, pp. 148-152), Rawls (1971, p. 399), Chisholm, (1986, p. 52), Falk (1986, pp. 117-118), 
Kagan (1989, p. 60), Gaus (1990, p. 111, p.156, p. 167), Anderson (1993, pp. 1-2, p. 17), Lemos (1994, p. 
12), Gibbard (1998, p. 241), Scanlon (1998, pp. 97-99), Parfit (2001) (2011a, pp. 38-41), Darwall (2004), 
Suikkanen (2005), Skorupski (2007) (2010), Stratton-Lake and Hooker (2006), Schroeder (2010), Way 
(2013). And for a discussion of the history of the view see Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004, pp. 
394-400) and Suikkanen (2009, pp. 768-769). 
4 See also Olson (2006) and Orsi (2013a). Way (2013) provides a notable exception.  
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In this chapter I introduce and explain the buck-passing account of value and explain the 
structure of the rest of this book in which I motivate (§2-5), defend (§6-9), and extend (§10-11) it. 
The buck-passing account analyses value in terms of normative reasons for pro-attitudes. In §1.1 
I explain the notion of a normative reason for a pro-attitude and its component parts: the notion 
of a normative reason and the notion of a pro-attitude. In §1.2 I explain the varieties of goodness 
that the buck-passing account of value is an account of and I explain how the buck-passing account 
analyses these varieties of goodness. In §1.3 I sketch the attractions of and motivations for the 
buck-passing account. In §1.4 I provide an overview of the rest of the book. And in §1.5 I explain 
several further important details of the buck-passing account: how it provides an account of several 
distinctions in goodness and value (§1.5.1); and the status of the buck-passing account, that is, 
whether it is a metaphysical and/or conceptual thesis (§1.5.2). 
 
1.1. Normative Reasons for Pro-attitudes 
The buck-passing account analyses value in terms of normative reasons for pro-attitudes. 
Normative reasons to perform some action or have some attitude are reasons that count in favour of 
or make a case for that action or attitude. We might say that normative reasons for an action or 
attitude justify that action or attitude. Or we might say that normative reasons for an action or 
attitude make it the case that, other things equal, we ought to perform that action or have that 
attitude.5 
 
Normative reasons are distinct from other types of reasons.  Suppose that an extremely 
heavy but dangerous man is about to cross a rope bridge. If he crosses and the bridge collapses, 
the reason why the bridge collapsed would be that he crossed the bridge; this is an explanatory reason. 
                                                 
5 See Alvarez (2016). 
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But this would be no normative reason for the bridge to collapse; there can be no reasons for bridges 
to perform actions because bridges are incapable of intentional action. So the fact that the man 
crossed the bridge would not be a normative reason for the bridge to collapse. There might, however, 
be a reason for people on the other side to try to make the bridge collapse so that the heavy 
dangerous man cannot cross and hurt them; this is a normative reason for these people to collapse 
the rope bridge. Normative and explanatory reasons should be distinguished from motivating 
reasons. If the people on one side of the bridge made the bridge collapse, the reason for which they 
made the bridge collapse would be in order to stop the dangerous man crossing: this would have 
been their motivating reason. (Motivating reasons are sometimes understood as considerations that 
agents take to be normative reasons for doing things, we might more broadly think of our 
motivating reason for -ing as our motive for -ing; and motivating reasons provide a kind of 
explanation, but not the only kind of explanation, of why people do things).6  
 
The buck-passing account doesn’t analyse value in terms of normative reasons for any 
action or attitude: it analyses value in terms of normative reasons for pro-attitudes. Pro-attitudes 
encompass all attitudes and actions that we might think of as positive. To have a pro-attitude in 
response to someone or something is to, for instance, desire, respect, admire, promote, praise, 
commend, protect, or approve of that thing or person.7  
 
                                                 
6 For accounts of motivating reasons see Schroeder (2007a, pp. 10-15) and Dancy (2000b). 
7 Some of these acts are more than mental acts: praising, protecting, and promoting partially involve or 
consist in actions. However, these actions also involve positive attitudes. I use the phrase ‘pro-attitude’ to 
cover this list of acts and attitudes because the phrase ‘pro-attitude’ is used more routinely in the literature 
than ‘pro-response’. 
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The concept of a normative reason for a pro-attitude is a familiar concept. We talk about 
normative reasons for pro-attitudes all the time. Thousands of people write blogs and newspaper 
and magazine articles numbering, listing, and explaining the reasons to admire scientists, singers, 
sportspeople, business leaders, civil disobedients, and actresses and actors. One article claims that 
there are 1,000 reasons to admire Roger Federer.8 Other articles argue that there are seven reasons 
to admire Dolly Parton and ten reasons to admire Amy Winehouse.9 There are articles discussing 
our reasons to admire Christiano Ronaldo and Taylor Swift.10 And another article describes the 
five reasons we supposedly have to admire Comcast.11 A quick Google search revealed hundreds 
of thousands of such articles. 
 
We discuss and write about reasons to want and desire a diverse range of things. For 
instance, reasons to want to be more productive, reasons to want classic cars, reasons to want to 
be healthy, reasons to want a baby girl rather than a baby boy, reasons to want more immigration, 
reasons to want to keep ducks, the best reason to want a boyfriend, and Luther Vandross asks for 
the reason to want us back.12 These reasons that we write about and ask for are reasons that warrant 
our wanting certain things: Vandross wants to know the reason why he should want us back, what 
warrants his wanting us back or counts in favour of wanting us back. And people write articles 
                                                 
8 See Jones (2012). 
9 See Crowder (2015) and Burrunjor (2015). 
10 See Inness (2014) and Fogarty (2015). 
11 See Marks (2014). 
12 See Vardy (2010), Malone (2015), Sheer Balance (2014), Buzzfeed (2014), Kirby (2014), Casey (2015), 
and Vandross’s song, ‘Give Me The Reason’.  
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about the reasons for other positive responses too such as whether we are giving employers 
reasons to hire us, the reasons to write a book, and the thirty-three reasons to visit New Zealand.13 
 
In this book I will be mainly concerned with reasons for what I call non-instrumental pro-
attitudes. Reasons for non-instrumental pro-attitudes are reasons for what we talk about as ‘for its 
own sake’ pro-attitudes such as reasons to desire something for its own sake or to admire someone 
for their own sake. I give a detailed account of the distinction between non-instrumental pro-
attitudes (for-its-own-sake pro-attitudes) and instrumental pro-attitudes (not-for-its-own-sake pro-
attitudes) in §6.2. The contrast between non-instrumental and instrumental pro-attitudes is easiest 
to see with desire. There are some things that we desire for their own sake and so desire non-
instrumentally. Most of us desire happiness for its own sake. And many of us desire achievement, 
friendship, and love for their own sakes. There are other things that we do not desire for their own 
sake and only desire instrumentally. Many of us only desire money instrumentally; we only desire 
money because it enables us to get other things that we want for their own sake such as happiness 
and safety. And most of us only desire to get on a plane as a means to doing other things; most of 
us do not want to be on a flight for its own sake. We talk about doing other things, such as keeping 
promises, for its own sake. But it is not clear that there are attitudes other than desires that we talk 
about having both instrumentally and non-instrumentally. This is because it is not clear that we 
can have other attitudes, such as admiration, instrumentally; it is not clear that we can admire 
someone because they are a means to something else as we can desire something instrumentally 
as a means to something else that we want for its own sake.  
 
The concept or property of being a normative reason for a pro-attitude may or may not 
be reducible to another normative notion. Some have argued that facts about reasons for pro-
                                                 
13 See Poole (2015), Tucker (2015), and theplanetD (2015). 
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attitudes can be reduced to facts about the pro-attitudes that it would be fitting to have or facts 
about the pro-attitudes that we ought to have (see §11). The buck-passing account of value is 
compatible with all these accounts of what it is to be a normative reason for a pro-attitude.14 But 
the buck-passing account is also compatible with the view, held most prominently by T.M. 
Scanlon, Derek Parfit, Jonathan Dancy, and John Skorupski, that the concept or property of being 
a normative reason is an irreducible and fundamental concept or property. According to this view, 
we cannot provide a reductive analysis of normative reasons in terms of any other normative (or 
other) property.15  
 
1.2. The Buck-Passing Account of Value 
There are several different varieties of goodness. We are discussing Goodness of a Kind (sometimes 
known as attributive goodness) when we say that a particular knife is a good one, or that Nadal is 
a good tennis player. When we judge that a knife is a good one, good as a knife, we judge that it is 
good as a particular kind of thing, or for a particular purpose; we do not judge that the knife is 
good in all ways, in a different way than as a knife, good on the whole, or good all-things-
considered.  Similarly, when we say that Nadal is a good tennis player we are not saying that he is 
a good person. We might think that judgments of goodness of a kind are judgments that something 
is better than average (at least) on some scale, at performing some function, or for some purpose, 
and this scale, function, or purpose seems to be set by or closely related to the kind in question—
such as tennis player or knife—or by a paradigm or exemplar of that kind.16  
 
                                                 
14 See McHugh and Way (2016, pp. 575-583). 
15 See Scanlon (1998, pp. 17-18), Parfit (2011a, p. 31), Dancy (2004), and Skorupski (2007) (2010). 
16 See Thomson (2008, pp. 19-23) and Ross (1930, pp. 66-67). 
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Prudential Goodness or goodness for a particular being or artefact is at issue when we judge 
that sun is good for plants, that the weather is good for ducks, and that regular exercise and five 
portions of fruit and vegetables a day is good for you, or good for ordinary human beings. When A is 
a living or conscious thing, X’s being good for A is tied to X’s benefitting A and X’s conducing to 
A’s flourishing or well-being. Being good for a particular object also seems to be an instance of this 
type of goodness: oil can be good for a lawnmower, for example. And X’s being good for an 
inanimate object is tied to X’s promoting that object’s healthy functioning. 
 
It seems to me, as it does to many others, that there is another type of goodness and value, 
goodness simpliciter and non-elliptical value.17 If something is good simpliciter or of non-elliptical value, 
then saying that it is good or of value is not elliptical for saying that it is good or of value for 
someone or something or good as something in particular. Things that are good simpliciter may 
always be good for someone, or good as a particular kind of thing, but they are also good in a way 
that exceeds their goodness for agents and their goodness as particular kinds of things in an 
important sense. Friendship and knowledge might be good simpliciter. The goodness of a friendship 
seems to (or at least may) outrun, or go beyond, the goodness of this friendship for each friend—
and everyone else. Knowledge, at least non-trivial knowledge, seems to have a value beyond the 
way it affects agents; it seems to have a goodness or value in itself. Equality seems to be good 
simpliciter too. For instance, many hold that Equal (below) is in one respect better than Unequal 
(below) even though in Unequal no one is worse-off than anyone in Equal.18 
 
 
                                                 
17 See Pigden (1990), Sinnott-Armstrong (2003), Olson (2005, ch. 3), Arneson (2010, p. 731), Fletcher 
(2012b), and Rolwand (2016b).  
18 See, for instance, Temkin (1986, p. 100). 
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Others have argued that pleasure, beauty, liberty, democracy, the punishment of wrongdoers, and 
the Nazis’ having lost the second world war are good simpliciter or of non-elliptical final value.19 (Even 
though, technically something could be finally prudentially valuable and finally attributively 
valuable, the phrase ‘final value’ seems to usually refer to non-elliptical final value. So, for the rest 
of this book, I’ll use ‘final value’ to refer to ‘non-elliptical final value’). 
 
Some have argued that there is no concept of goodness simpliciter or that nothing has the 
property of being good simpliciter. Elsewhere I have argued that we should reject such good 
simpliciter skepticism.20 And some have suggested that if, as the buck-passing account holds, what 
it is for X to be good simpliciter is just for there to be reasons for everyone to have pro-attitudes 
towards X, then there are no longer any grounds for skepticism about goodness simpliciter. This is 
because skeptics about goodness simpliciter are not skeptics about reasons for pro-attitudes.21 But 
even if there is no concept of goodness simpliciter or no property of being good simpliciter there is a 
concept that plays the role of being that which ethicists and moral and political philosophers debate 
and discuss when they debate and discuss the value of equality, democracy, and liberty, and when 
                                                 
19 See Cohen (1995, p. 261), Dworkin (2001, pp. 185–190), Carter (1999, ch. 2), Helm (2009, §2.1), Nozick 
(1981, pp. 374–379), Moore (1903, ch. 3), and Olson (2005, pp. 34-35). 
20 See Rowland (2016b). Byrne (2016) shows that one argument for good simpliciter skepticism not explicitly 
discussed in Rowland (2016b) fails.  
21 See McHugh and Way (2016, p. 578).  
Equal 
Agent A B C D 
Welfare 100 100 100 100 
Unequal 
Agent A B C D 
Welfare 200 100 100 100 
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they debate and discuss whether pleasure is the only thing that is good in itself or whether other 
things, such as autonomy, matter too. That is, there is a concept that plays the role of—what we 
might think of as being—the central evaluative topic of ethics. If we should be skeptical about the 
idea that we have a concept of goodness simpliciter or that there is a property of being good 
simpliciter, then these discussions of goodness and value must be discussions about some kind of 
goodness for or goodness of a kind property. Skeptics about goodness simpliciter have somewhat 
plausible proposals as to which goodness for or goodness of a kind property plays this role of being 
the central evaluative topic of ethics.22 (A certain goodness for property might play this role; for 
instance, it might be that what is good for everyone plays this role of being the central evaluative topic 
of ethics).  
 
The buck-passing account of value is primarily an account of goodness simpliciter.23 But if 
you believe that there is nothing that is good simpliciter or of final value, then you should understand 
the buck-passing account as primarily an account of the variety of goodness and value that plays 
the role of being the central evaluative topic of ethics. I will refer to this variety of goodness and 
value as goodness simpliciter and final value. But the fact that I refer to this variety of goodness by 
this name does not matter for the project of this book; by goodness simpliciter understand me to 
have in mind either goodness simpliciter or whatever particular attributive or prudential value 
                                                 
22 See Finlay (2014, ch. 7) and Ridge (2014, esp. pp. 41-43). 
23 See Scanlon (2011) (1998, ch. 2-3, esp. pp. 97-99), Parfit (2011a, pp. 38-40), Ewing (1947, ch. 5), Orsi 
(2015, esp. ch. 1-3), Heathwood, (2008, pp. 47-51), Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004, p. 399 n. 
29 and p. 391), and McHugh and Way (2016, pp. 577-578). John Skorupski is the exception here: Skorupski 
(2010, pp. 82-87) views the account as an account of prudential and attributive goodness and value. 
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property you think plays this goodness simpliciter-like role in our discussions about goodness and 
value.24  
 
Now, according to,  
 
The Buck-Passing Account of Good Simpliciter (BPA). What it is for X to be non-instrumentally 
good simpliciter or of final value is just for X to have properties that provide reasons for us 
to have non-instrumental pro-attitudes in response to X (such as to desire or admire X for 
its own sake). 
 
As I discuss in §5, the difference between X being good simpliciter, Y being good as a kind of thing, 
and Z being prudentially good for someone or something resides in the different sets of agents that 
have reasons to have pro-attitudes towards X, Y, and Z. This is reflected in the different buck-
passing accounts of the different varieties of goodness. Whereas the buck-passing accounts of 
goodness as a kind of thing K and goodness for S that I articulate in §5 specify a particular set of 
agents related to K/S that have reasons to have pro-attitudes towards things that are good as Ks 
or good for S, BPA simply holds that for X to be good simpliciter is for there to be reasons for us to 
have pro-attitudes in response to X. And reasons for ‘us’ should be understood as reasons for 
everyone or agent-neutral reasons, that is, reasons that everyone has that do not depend on what we 
                                                 
24 My argument in §5 against alternative views of the relationship between reasons and value to the buck-
passing account depends on there being a concept of goodness simpliciter or a property of being good 
simpliciter. But skeptics about goodness simpliciter can see the majority of §5 as engaged in the important task 
of articulating, motivating, and defending buck-passing accounts of all varieties of prudential and attributive 
goodness. 
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care about or any particular connection we bear to something.25 So, most generally, according to 
the view that I defend in this book 
 
What it is for X to be good or of value is just for there to be reasons for some (particular) 
set of agents to have pro-attitudes in response to X.  
 
 
One further clarification about whom the reasons that feature in BPA are reasons for. It 
might seem that if an agent doesn’t know about something, then there are no reasons for them to 
have pro-attitudes towards that thing. For instance, suppose that Mother Teresa’s actions were 
good simpliciter but that I’m not aware of them—and nor could I easily become aware of them. Is 
there a reason for me to have pro-attitudes towards Mother Teresa’s actions such as to be glad 
that she did what she did? If the answer is no, this problem can be easily ameliorated. For the 
reasons in BPA could be specified as reasons for us to have pro-attitudes in response to X so long 
as we are aware of or understand X and its reason-providing features.26 (I won’t add such a 
specification into BPA just for the sake of making this book easier to read but if you think that 
such a knowledge or understanding constraint on whom the reasons in BPA are reasons for is 
needed, take such a constraint to be implicit in BPA). 
 
                                                 
25 See Stratton-Lake and Hooker (2006, p. 153). For a discussion of agent-neutral reasons see Ridge (2011). 
26 Cf. Broad (1930, p. 280) Chisholm (1981) (2005), Lemos (1994, pp. 3-19), Zimmerman (2001, pp. 15-
32), and Bykvist (2009, pp. 3-4). 
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1.3. Motivations for the Buck-Passing Account  
There are several positive reasons to accept BPA, which I discuss in detail in §4-5. First, BPA 
provides an informative account of what it is for something to be good simpliciter. Second, BPA 
explains the correlation that we find between goodness simpliciter and reasons for pro-attitudes. 
Namely, that if something is good simpliciter, there are reasons for us to have pro-attitudes towards 
it. As I discuss in §4.1, this correlation calls out for explanation and BPA explains it. 
 
A third motivation for BPA concerns non-derivative reasons. Non-derivative reasons to  
are reasons to  the normative force of which does not derive from the normative force of other 
reasons to . To get the idea of a non-derivative reason in mind consider two views about our 
reasons to keep promises. According to one view, there are (non-derivative) reasons for us to keep 
our promises even if no good would come of our keeping them. According to another view, the 
only reasons for us to keep our promises are (derivative) reasons that derive from the good 
consequences of our keeping our promises or our being disposed to keep our promises. 
Something’s being good never seems to provide anyone with a non-derivative reason to have pro-
attitudes towards that thing. For instance, suppose that I would have an enjoyable and relaxing 
time in St Ives and this is a reason for me to take a holiday there. And because I would have an 
enjoyable and relaxing time in St Ives, it would be good simpliciter if I went there for a holiday. The 
fact that it would be good if I went to St Ives is no reason for me to go to there that does not 
derive from the fact that it would be enjoyable and relaxing if I went there; that is, the fact that it 
would be good if I went to St Ives is no non-derivative reason for me to go there or have pro-
attitudes towards going there. BPA explains why goodness never provides us with non-derivative 
reasons to have pro-attitudes. This is because according to BPA, something’s being good is just its 
having the property of having other properties that provide us with reasons to have pro-attitudes 
towards it.  
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Fourth, as I explain in §4.5, similar theoretical debates arise regarding reasons and value 
and BPA explains why. Fifth, the more general buck-passing account of goodness that I articulated 
in the previous section explains what the different varieties of goodness (prudential goodness, 
attributive goodness, and goodness simpliciter) have in common; that is, why they are all types of 
goodness. And, as I explain in §5, we cannot explain this unless we accept the buck-passing 
account. 
 
 There are several other reasons to accept BPA that derive from problems with the only 
alternatives to it. BPA does not primarily compete with alternative accounts of good simpliciter 
because it is consistent with many other accounts of the concept or property of being good 
simpliciter. For instance, as I explained in §1.1, BPA is compatible with analysing normative reasons 
in terms of fittingness or ought. So, BPA is compatible with the view that for X to be good is for 
it to be fitting to have pro-attitudes towards X. Instead BPA primarily competes with alternative 
accounts of the relationship between reasons and value. There are only two views about the 
relationship between reasons and value that BPA is incompatible with, and so with which BPA 
competes.  
 
First, the value-first account (VFA), which reduces facts about reasons to facts about 
value. Many have articulated and/or defended VFA including G.E. Moore, Joseph Raz, Michael 
Smith, Ralph Wedgwood, Ulrike Heuer, Barry Maguire, Jonas Olson, and Francesco Orsi.27 There 
are several particular versions of VFA but one paradigmatic version of VFA holds that what it is 
                                                 
27 See Moore (1903, pp. 24-26), Raz (2001, pp. 164-166), Smith (1994, chapter 5), Wedgwood (2009), 
Heuer (2004), Olson (2006), Orsi (2013a), Way (2013, pp. 35-47), Lord and Maguire (2016, pp. 16-17) and 
Maguire (2016). 
 19 
for there to be reasons to desire and promote equality, freedom, and pleasure is just for equality, 
freedom, and pleasure to be of value.  
 
Second, a pluralistic and non-reductionist view that holds that facts about reasons cannot 
be reduced to facts about value (VFA is false) but nor can facts about value be reduced to facts 
about reasons (BPA is false). We can call this view the no-priority view (NPV). For on this view 
neither reasons nor have priority over, or are more fundamental than, one another. According to 
NPV, the evaluative cannot be reduced to the normative and the normative cannot be reduced to 
the evaluative. If we hold NPV, we will hold that what it is for equality, freedom, and pleasure to 
be of value is not just for there to be reasons to desire and promote equality, freedom, and pleasure. 
But neither is it the case that what it is for there to be reasons to promote and desire equality, 
freedom, and pleasure is just for equality, freedom, and pleasure to be of value. NPV seems to be 
endorsed by Jonathan Dancy, and W.D. Ross.28 NPV also seems to be a view that David Wiggins 
and John McDowell have held or have gestured towards.29 
 
In §4 I argue that if we accept NPV, we are committed to there being no explanation of 
the correlations and similarities between reasons and value such as the similar theoretical debates 
that have arisen about reasons and value and the striking correlation that we find between reasons 
and value, namely that if something is good, then there are reasons to have pro-attitudes towards 
it. If we accept NPV, we are also committed, I argue, to an unnecessarily ontologically profligate 
and qualitatively unparsimonious view. And this gives us further reason to reject NPV.  
 
                                                 
28 See Dancy (2000a) and Ross (1939, pp. 278-279 and p. 283). 
29 See Wiggins (1987, pp. 195), McDowell (1998a, pp. 157-158), and Jacobson (2011, esp. §2.2).  
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In §2 and §3 I argue that we have good reasons to reject VFA. In §2 I argue that all 
versions of VFA are views that we have reason to reject because they are inconsistent with 
substantial widely held and plausible views in normative ethics. My argument in §3 concerns what 
I call the unity of the normative. According to the unity of the normative, reasons for belief and reasons 
for pro-attitudes are instances of the same relation with different relata; reasons for belief and 
reasons for pro-attitudes denote the same relation just warranting different things: beliefs in one 
case and pro-attitudes in the other.30 In §3 I argue that the unity of the normative is very plausible and 
we should reject a view that entails its falsity. But I argue that VFA entails the falsity of the unity of 
the normative—whereas BPA does not. 
 
As, I’ll explain, these problems with VFA and NPV are extremely pertinent for whether 
we should accept BPA. One type of view that involves the negation of both BPA and VFA is not 
a view that I have in mind when I am discussing NPV. According to this view, another normative 
property N, such as fittingness or ought, is more fundamental than both reasons and value, what 
it is for X to be of value is for X to have some particular N property, and what it is for X to be a 
reason for a pro-attitude is for X to have some (other) particular N property. I do not discuss, or 
have in mind, views that reduce both reasons and value to another normative property when I 
discuss NPV because such views are very close in spirit to BPA; they are, we might say, normative-
first views of the relationship between the normative and the evaluative. Indeed, other normative-
first views are so closely aligned to BPA that BPA is sometimes called a fitting-attitude account of 
value and fitting-attitude accounts are sometimes called buck-passing accounts.31 And, so by NPV 
I mean the view that VFA does not hold, BPA does not hold, and no other normative-first 
                                                 
30 See Stratton-Lake (2002, pp. xxv-xxvi) and Kearns and Star (2009, pp. 219-220). 
31 See, for instance, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004), Jacobson (2011, §2.1), and Way (2013, 
esp. pp. 27-31). 
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account of the relationship between the normative and the evaluative holds. In §11 I argue that 
we should accept BPA over alternative normative-first views. But it seems that either VFA, NPV, 
or a normative-first account of the relationship between reasons and value must hold; these three 
types of account exhaust logical space. In this case the fact that there are serious problems with 
both NPV and VFA is extremely pertinent for whether we should accept BPA or another 
normative-first account. For if there are serious problems with the only alternatives to 
BPA/normative-first accounts, we ought to accept BPA or another normative-first account.32 
1.4. Overview of the Book 
The first part of this book, §2-5, is dedicated to making the case for BPA that I discussed in the 
previous section in more detail. In §2-3 I give arguments against VFA, in §4 I make several 
arguments for accepting BPA rather than NPV. And in §5 I give an argument for accepting BPA 
rather than VFA or NPV. 
 
                                                 
32 To clarify, BPA is consistent with fittingness-first accounts of reasons. For instance, we could combine 
a fittingness-first account of reasons and BPA. We would then say that for X to be of value is for there to 
be reasons for us to have non-instrumental pro-attitudes in response to X. And for there to be reasons for 
us to have non-instrumental pro-attitudes in response to X is for it to be fitting for us to have non-
instrumental pro-attitudes in response to X. Such a view would be a buck-passing/fitting-attitude account 
of value. Proponents of fittingness-first views tend to want to claim that we should reject BPA because of 
the wrong kind of reason problem; see Chappell (2012), McHugh and Way (2016), and Howard 
(forthcoming). However, in §6 I argue that the wrong kind of reason problem does not show that we should 
reject BPA and in §11.4 I argue that proponents of the combination of a fittingness-first account of reasons 
and the fitting-attitude account of value are not in a better position regarding the wrong kind of reason 
problem than proponents of the combination of the reasons-first account and BPA.  
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In the second part of this book I argue that all of the objections that have been made to 
BPA can be overcome. There are broadly four types of objections to BPA. First, that it implies 
that there is value where there is none, or as I put it, that it produces too much value, because for 
some Xs, (i) there are reasons for us to have pro-attitudes towards X, and so BPA entails that X 
is of value, but (ii) X is not of value, and so BPA entails that something that is not of value is of 
value. If (i) and (ii) hold for some Xs, then BPA produces too much value. The much-discussed 
wrong kind of reason problem for BPA is the problem of revising BPA in a non-ad-hoc non-
circular way so that it does not produce too much value (or showing that it does not need to be 
so revised in order to not produce too much value).33 The following kind of case seems to be one 
in which BPA produces too much value. Suppose that an evil demon will punish us if we do not 
admire it for its own sake. It seems that there is reason for us to admire the demon for its own 
sake and so that BPA entails that the demon is good or of value. But the demon is not of value. 
So, BPA seems to entail the existence of value where there is none. In §6 I argue that BPA does 
not produce too much value in this kind of case because there are no reasons for us to admire the 
demon for its own sake even when it will punish us if we do not admire it for its own sake. And I 
argue that even if BPA did produce too much value in this kind of case BPA can be easily revised 
so as to not produce too much value. 
 
 The second type of objection to BPA is the opposite objection, namely that BPA produces 
too little value.34 According to the too little value objection, for some Xs, (i) X is of value, so in order 
to be plausible BPA must entail that X is of value, but (ii) it is not the case that there are reasons 
for us to have pro-attitudes towards X, so BPA entails that X is not of value. For instance, consider 
the pleasure of a non-rational being, such as a bird, in a world without any rational beings. The 
                                                 
33 See Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004). 
34 See Dancy (2000a, pp. 170-171), Bykvist (2009), and Reisner (2015). 
 23 
pleasure of this bird is valuable. But there are no reasons for anyone to have pro-attitudes to the 
bird’s pleasure. And so, it seems that according to BPA, such a bird’s pleasure is not of value. In 
§7 I argue that BPA does not generate too little value in cases like this because there are reasons 
for agents in other worlds to have pro-attitudes towards such a bird’s pleasure. And I argue that 
even if BPA did produce too little value in cases like this it can be easily revised to no longer have 
this implication. 
 
 The third type of objection to BPA concerns neutrality. Some have argued that BPA takes 
sides on too many debates in normative ethics, and so is not sufficiently neutral regarding 
substantial first-order normative matters.35 In §8 I show that this is not the case. A fourth type of 
objection concerns other evaluative concepts and properties. Some have argued that BPA is 
implausible because if we accept it, then we should accept a buck-passing account of other 
evaluative concepts or properties such as good for, goodness of a kind, or thick evaluative concepts 
such as ‘generous’, ‘kind’, and ‘cruel’.36 In §5 and §9 I argue that BPA does not encounter problems 
because it must extend to these other evaluative concepts and properties.  
 
In the final part of this book I move beyond motivating and defending BPA and extend 
BPA to provide an account of morality and all of practical normativity in terms of normative 
reasons. In §10 I show that similar arguments to those that motivate BPA can be used to motivate 
a buck-passing account of moral properties such as moral right and wrong. I defend a new buck-
passing account of moral properties that analyses all moral properties in terms of non-role-
dependent reasons for action and reasons to want to make amends. This account is distinctive, 
                                                 
35 See Dancy (2000a, pp. 167-168), Olson (2007a) (2007b), Brunero (2010), and Heuer (2010, p. 180). 
36 See Heathwood (2008), Gregory (2013), Brännmark (2008, pp. 306-308), Kraut (2011, pp. 57-58), Crisp 
(2005, p. 82), and Väyrynen (2006, pp. 309-314). 
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new, and controversial. And this account is ambitious in that it tries to provide an account of 
morality and moral reasons in general, as well as an account of what distinguishes the moral domain 
from other normative domains. Furthermore, some have argued that we cannot give an account 
of what distinguishes the moral from the non-moral without doing first-order normative ethics.37 
In §10 I try to do exactly that which has been claimed to be impossible: I try to give a formal 
account of the moral without doing first-order normative ethics. I show that there are strong 
reasons to accept my buck-passing account of morality, that this buck-passing account of morality 
does not encounter insuperable objections, and that there are strong reasons to reject the only 
alternative views to a buck-passing account of morality. 
 
In §11 I extend the buck-passing account to provide an account of oughts and fittingness 
in terms of normative reasons and, building on the arguments in §2-10, I show that we should 
accept a reasons-first account of practical normativity, according to which, ethics, morality, and 
the normativity of all that is practically normative consists in facts about reasons that cannot be 
reduced to facts about other normative or evaluative properties. In making this argument in §11 I 
give one of the first arguments for the prominently endorsed but relatively un-argued for reasons-
first account of practical normativity.38 I show that the reasons-first account provides an attractive, 
explanatorily fruitful, and compelling map of the nature and interaction of normative, evaluative, 
moral, and deontic properties and an explanation of the nature of the normativity of the evaluative, 
                                                 
37 See, for instance, Dorsey (2016). 
38 See Scanlon (2014, p. 2), Skorupski (2010), and Schroeder (2007a, p. 81). Skorupski (2010) does give 
arguments for the reasons-first view. However, in Rowland (2011) I argue that Skorupski’s arguments do 
not succeed. 
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the moral, and the deontic.39 And, as I discuss in §11.5, the fact that we can extend BPA to provide 
such an account of practical normativity provides us with further reasons to accept BPA.  
 
1.5. Clarifying the Buck-Passing Account  
In the rest of this introductory chapter I’ll clarify how various distinctions in value are made if we 
accept BPA. And I’ll discuss the controversial issue of whether BPA is a conceptual or 
metaphysical thesis. 
 
1.5.2. Distinctions in Value 
BPA distinguishes between instrumental and non-instrumental goodness and final and non-final 
value. That which is non-instrumentally good or of final value is good or of value for its own sake. 
For instance, money is only instrumentally good. Money is only good as a means to things that are 
non-instrumentally good such as enjoyable experiences, knowledge, achievement, and health. BPA 
analyses the instrumental goodness and value of things such as money in the following way: 
 
Instrumental Value. What it is for Y to be instrumentally good simpliciter or instrumental to 
something of final value is just for Y to be a means to something, X, that there are reasons 
for us to have non-instrumental pro-attitudes towards. 
 
So, according to BPA, for happiness to be of final value is just for there to be reasons for us to 
desire it for its own sake. And money’s being of instrumental value consists in money being a 
means to something, such as happiness, that we have reasons to desire for its own sake. And 
similarly, for friendship to be of only instrumental, and not final, value is just for friendship to be 
                                                 
39 I follow Dancy (2004, p. 34) in referring to facts about what we ought to do as deontic facts.  
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a means to something that we have reasons to desire for its own sake, such as happiness, but for 
friendship not to be something that we have reason to desire for its own sake.  
 
It might seem that instrumental goodness simpliciter is an oxymoron because to be good 
simpliciter is to be good without qualification. However, the phrase goodness simpliciter is a term of 
art designed to contrast the goodness that certain things have with attributive and prudential 
goodness. To be instrumentally good simpliciter is to be a means to something that is good simpliciter 
rather than attributively or prudentially good. ‘Instrumentally good simpliciter’ is just shorthand for 
‘a means to something that is non-instrumentally good simpliciter’. 
 
In addition to the distinction between instrumental and final goodness and value there is, 
in the literature on value, a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value. We can aptly preserve 
this distinction if we hold BPA, for we can add to BPA that 
 
Intrinsic Final Value. What it is for X to be of intrinsic final value is just for X to have 
intrinsic properties that provide reasons for us to have non-instrumental pro-attitudes in 
response to it. 
 
Extrinsic Final Value. What it is for X to be of extrinsic final value is just for X to have 
extrinsic properties that provide reasons for us to have non-instrumental pro-attitudes in 
response to it.40 
 
                                                 
40 Intrinsic Final Value and Extrinsic Final Value fit with Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen’s (2000, pp. 
36-37) distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value in terms of good-making features or properties; see 
also Zimmerman (2010, §3). 
 27 
 
This distinction fits with common examples of intrinsic and extrinsic value. According to 
BPA’s distinction, a state of affairs in which someone is in conscious pleasure will be of intrinsic 
final value because an intrinsic feature of this state of affairs, namely the conscious pleasure, 
provides reasons for everyone to have pro-attitudes in response to it. And one of Princess Diana’s 
dresses is of extrinsic final value—supposing that it is—because the reasons for us to have positive 
responses to it are provided by extrinsic properties of the dress, namely the property it has of being 
a dress that Diana wore.41 (To clarify, however, although BPA can distinguish intrinsic and extrinsic 
final value in the way that I’ve been discussing, it does not follow from BPA that there are instances 
of extrinsic final value). 
 
 There are different degrees of goodness and value. And these different degrees of X’s 
goodness and value correspond to the strength of the reasons that there are to respond to X. To 
see this, however, we need to introduce some distinctions in normative reasons. The notion of a 
normative reason to  that BPA analyses value in terms of is a pro tanto or contributory notion 
rather than an overall or all-things considered notion. The fact that there are pro tanto reasons to  
does not establish that overall one should . There might be reasons to take one option even 
though what one should do, and what there is most reason to do, is to take another option. 
Suppose that I’ve promised that I’ll go to visit my mother this weekend but that there’s a great 
party that I’d much rather go to and that it would be a lot of fun to go to. In this case there is some 
reason for me to stay and go to the party, and thereby break my promise, even though there is 
most reason (suppose) for me to keep my promise and go to visit my mother.42 
To be a little more specific,  
                                                 
41 The example of Diana’s dress derives from Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000, p. 41). 
42 On the contributory and the overall see Dancy (2004, pp. 15-25). 
 28 
 
Pro Tanto Reason. There is pro tanto reason for A to  so long as there is some reason for A 
to .  
 
There can be a pro tanto reason for A to  even if there is more reason for A to not- rather than 
to , and even if it is not the case that A should . But 
 
Sufficient Reason. There is sufficient reason for A to  so long as there is not more reason 
for A to not- than to .  
 
There is sufficient reason for A to  so long as it is not the case that A should not  even if it is 
not the case that A should uniquely . There is sufficient reason for A to  even if there is 
something other than -ing that A has just as much reason to do as -ing. That is, even if A ought 
to ( or perform some act other than -ing). And  
 
Most Reason. There is (uniquely) most (or decisive) reason for A to  so long as there is 
more reason for A to  than perform any competing act other than -ing.  
 
There is most reason for A to  so long as -ing is the only thing that A ought to do.43 
 
Now, corresponding to the notions of pro tanto, sufficient, and most reason are notions of 
being good or of value to some extent, of being good or of value overall, and of being (uniquely) 
best. A government’s education policy could be good to an extent because it would get children 
                                                 
43 See Parfit (2011a, pp. 32-37). 
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to be more productive without being a good education policy overall because it involves children 
being taught material that they should not be taught and failing to be taught material that they 
should be taught. And something could be good overall without being uniquely best. For instance, 
consider two worlds. In the first world there is a great amount of happiness but not quite so much 
achievement. In the second world there is a great amount of achievement but not quite so much 
happiness. It might be that neither of these worlds is better than the other and so that neither is 
uniquely best but that both are good overall. A necessary addition to BPA is the following set of 
distinctions between different degrees of value: 
 
Good To Some Extent. What it is for X to be to some extent non-instrumentally good simpliciter 
is just for there to be a pro tanto reason for us to have a non-instrumental pro-attitude in 
response to X.  
 
Good Overall. What it is for X to be non-instrumentally good simpliciter overall is just for there 
to be sufficient reason for us to have a non-instrumental pro-attitude towards X. 
 
(Uniquely) Best. What it is for X to be (uniquely) non-instrumentally best simpliciter is just for 
there to be most reason for us to have a non-instrumental pro-attitude towards X.44 
                                                 
44 It might be wondered whether BPA takes a stand on whether ‘good’ is prior to ‘better’ or vice versa. It 
might seem that BPA entails that neither ‘good’ nor ‘better’ are prior to one another. For both are analysed 
in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes according to BPA. This may well be a welcome conclusion for in 
several articles Johan Gustafsson (2014) (2016) has plausibly argued that neither ‘good’ nor ‘better’ should 
be analysed in terms of one another. However, it may be possible to supplement BPA with further 
arguments that entail that ‘good’ can be analysed in terms of ‘better’ or vice versa. For instance, if BPA were 
combined with the view that all reasons for pro-attitudes can be analysed in terms of reasons for 
preferences, then it might seem that BPA would analyse goodness in terms of betterness, or would be 
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 In addition to the different varieties of, degrees of, and distinctions in value that I have so 
far discussed, we sometimes refer to what we might call different genres of value such as aesthetic, 
economic, epistemic, and sentimental value. If we accept BPA, we can just understand Xs being, 
for instance, of epistemic value as Xs just being of final value and being related to epistemic 
concerns—an account of what it is to be of epistemic concern is beyond the scope of the buck-
passing account and this book. (This approach to how we should understand different genres of 
value is complicated slightly by the fact that certain genres of value are not genres of final value. 
For instance, economic value seems to be a type of value-as-a-kind of thing: it seems that to be of 
economic value is to be of value as an economic commodity in the same way that to be good as a 
knife is to be good as a specific kind of thing, namely a knife).  
 
As I discuss in §9, BPA may not extend to provide an account of thick evaluative properties 
such as kindness, cruelty, and generosity. Other somewhat thick evaluative properties should, 
however, be analysed in terms of reasons. For instance, if we accept buck-passing accounts of 
goodness and value, then we should hold that for A to be admirable is just for there to be reasons 
to admire A for its own sake and for X to be desirable is just for there to be reasons to desire X.45 
 
 I’ve discussed how BPA understands different varieties of, degrees of, distinctions in, and 
genres of value in terms of normative reasons. But if it is plausible to hold buck-passing accounts 
                                                 
equivalent to such an analysis. For if all reasons for pro-attitudes were reasons for preferences, then BPA 
would analyse all monadic value claims/properties in terms of comparative evaluative properties. Most 
generally, I do not believe that BPA closes off the option that ‘good’ can be defined in terms of ‘better’ or 
vice versa. 
45 Cf. Smith (2016), Skorupski (1996, p. 205), Tappolet (2004) (2013), Schueler (1995, p. 84), Suikkanen 
(2014a, pp. 86-89), and Väyrynen (2013a, p. 37). 
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of goodness and value, we should be able to plausibly adopt buck-passing accounts of badness 
and dis-value. It seems to me that badness and dis-value should be analysed in a way that is the 
mirror image of the way that goodness and value are analysed according to BPA: it seems to me 
that what it is for X to be bad simpliciter is just for there to be reasons for us to have con-attitudes 
in response to X. Where con-attitudes include disapproval, holding in contempt, being averse to, 
condemning, criticising, and/or desiring that something not be brought about. For instance, for 
pain and torture to be bad simpliciter is just for there to be reasons for us to be averse to instances 
of pain and torture and to desire that instances of pain and torture are not brought about. 
 
1.5.2. BPA: Metaphysical or Conceptual?  
BPA is an account of the property that we’re talking about something having when we talk about 
something being good or valuable. There are many different conflicting first-order theories of 
what things are of final value. For instance, hedonists hold that only pleasure is of final value and 
pluralists hold that a plurality of different things, such as friendship, beauty, achievement, 
autonomy, and virtue, are finally valuable. BPA is an account of that which hedonists and pluralists 
are disagreeing about when they disagree about what things are of final value. And BPA is an 
account of one of the things that non-naturalists, reductive naturalists, and non-cognitivists 
disagree about the metaphysical status of. Accordingly, BPA is not, or at any rate is not intended 
to be, in competition with substantive first-order views of which things are of final value or with 
views about the metaphysical status of facts about or judgments about goodness or value. (I explain 
how BPA is consistent with various metaethical views in detail in a footnote).46 Instead BPA is  
                                                 
46 BPA does not entail any particular metaethical view about the general nature of moral properties, moral 
language, moral concepts, or moral judgments. BPA is consistent with the view that what it is for R to be 
a normative reason to  is just for R to have a certain natural property. And BPA is consistent with the 
view that what it is for R to be a normative reason to  is for R to have an irreducibly normative non-
 32 
                                                 
natural property. But if what it is for R to be a normative reason to  is just for R to have a certain natural 
property and BPA holds, then what it is for X to be good simpliciter is just for X to have properties that 
provide reasons for us to have pro-attitudes in response to X. And there is more to be said about what it is 
for R to be a reason for a pro-attitude, namely we can say more about the natural property (or properties) 
that the property of being a reason for a pro-attitude consists in. (As I discuss in §8.3, BPA is also consistent 
with the view, which many reductive naturalists hold, that all normative reasons for action are hypothetical 
and all reasons to desire X are provided by the benefits of having X). 
BPA is compatible with the moral error theory. BPA merely holds that we should understand the 
property of being of final value in terms of normative reasons if there is such a property as being of final 
value.  
BPA is consistent with expressivist views according to which moral and normative judgments 
consist in desire-like states rather than belief-like states. Prominent expressivist Allan Gibbard (1990) 
accepts that judgments about the goodness of X are just judgments about the reasons for having certain 
pro-attitudes towards X. Gibbard just thinks that we are best off understanding these judgments as 
consisting in desire-like mental states rather than belief-like mental states. Furthermore, many expressivists 
are now quasi-realists who hold that even though our moral judgments consist in desire-like states we can 
still hold that there are moral facts, truths, properties, beliefs, and knowledge. BPA is consistent with this 
expressivist quasi-realism according to which there are facts about, and properties of being of, value; see 
Blackburn (1999) and Orsi (2015, pp. 17-18). 
BPA also seems to be consistent with relativist metaethical views, although it might need revising 
a little for relativists. Relativists hold that nothing is merely right, wrong, good, or bad. Rather, according 
to relativists, actions and other things are only right, wrong, good, and bad relative to various standards; 
that is, there is nothing that is good simpliciter but only things that are good-relative-to-standard-S. If we 
endorse such a relativist view we can still hold BPA—although, as I discussed in §1.2, ‘goodness simpliciter’ 
in BPA should not be understood as literally denoting goodness simpliciter if relativism holds but rather as 
denoting whatever standard-relative goodness property plays the goodness simpliciter role. Such a relativistic 
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(a) An account of the properties of being non-instrumentally good simpliciter and being of final 
value; and/or  
(b) An account of the concepts of non-instrumental goodness simpliciter and final value.  
 
BPA certainly provides (a), I will understand BPA to be primarily (a), and according to one 
plausible view philosophical analyses just are property reductions.47  I don’t want to be too 
declarative about whether BPA also provides (b). All of the arguments in this book, as I take care 
to show, go through regardless of whether BPA is (a) and/or (b).  But I am attracted to the view 
that BPA can provide a plausible unobvious conceptual analysis of goodness simpliciter and final value 
as well as a plausible account of the property of being of final value.  
 
 There are two salient worries about the idea that BPA can provide a plausible unobvious 
conceptual analysis of the concept final value that I will address. First, it might seem that if we 
accept BPA and BPA is a conceptual analysis, then we must accept that those who reject BPA are 
conceptually confused. And this is implausible. However, it is not apt to claim that someone is 
conceptually confused if they reject a conceptual analysis that is only revealed as correct to us after 
we have a deep understanding of a series of complicated arguments. Rather someone who rejects 
a conceptual analysis that we only see to be correct if we understand the complicated arguments 
that reveal its truth is merely not aware of these complex arguments that reveal the analysis’s truth: 
someone who rejects such an analysis is not conceptually confused but rather has just not realised 
that there are sound arguments that show the analysis’s truth. Of course, denying a conceptual 
                                                 
version of BPA will hold that what it is for X to be of value-relative-to-certain-standards is just for there 
to be reasons-relative-to-certain-standards for everyone to have pro-attitudes in response to X. 
47 See, for instance, King (1998). 
 34 
truth involves a mistake about a concept but we might understand a lot about a concept and still 
make a mistake about it. A conceptual error doesn’t involve wholesale error or misunderstanding 
and nor does it involve a lack of a sophisticated understanding of a concept but merely a failing to 
grasp some truth about a concept. 
 
 A second worry about the idea that BPA provides an unobvious conceptual analysis of 
goodness and value is that if this were the case, then we must become acquainted with reasons for 
pro-attitudes before we become acquainted with goodness and value. But we become acquainted 
with goodness and value before we become acquainted with reasons for pro-attitudes. So, BPA 
does not provide a plausible conceptual analysis of goodness and value.  
 
But it is not obvious that BPA holds as a conceptual truth only if we become acquainted 
with reasons before we become acquainted with goodness and value. For instance, Michael Smith 
claims that X can provide a good conceptual analysis of Y so long as X best explains our inferential 
judgments about Y and the other ways in which we use Y.48 If this is all it takes for a conceptual 
analysis of Y in terms of X to be a good one, then the grasp of X need not be temporally prior to 
the grasp of Y in order for X to provide a good conceptual analysis of Y. And it seems that BPA 
can be a good conceptual analysis of value for the reasons that Smith believes that analyses that 
are good conceptual analyses are good ones. For if my argument in this book is correct, BPA best 
explains our inferential judgments about value, the other ways that we use our concepts of 
goodness and value, and the way that we use our concept of value vis-à-vis our concept of a reason 
and vice versa. And this is why, as I see it, BPA is a very plausible, and explanatorily powerful, 
                                                 
48 See Smith (1997, p. 103). 
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unobvious conceptual analysis of value. So, BPA is an account of the property of being good 
simpliciter and perhaps also the concept of being good simpliciter.49 
 
                                                 
49 If, as I’ve been suggesting, BPA is primarily an account of the property of being of value, then BPA 
reduces the property that X has of being good simpliciter to the property X has of having other properties 
that provide reasons for everyone to have pro-attitudes in response to X. Some people worry about what 
property reductions such as this really are; that is, some worry about what it means to reduce one property 
to another. I believe that that we should follow Mark Schroeder and hold that these property reductions 
give asymmetric accounts of the structure of properties. So, BPA holds that the structure of the property 
of being of value consists in having features that give everyone reasons to have pro-attitudes. We can 
illustrate this view of what property reductions are with some examples. Consider a reduction of the 
property of being triangular to the property of having three sides. According to this view of property 
reductions, such a reduction holds (i) that the property of being triangular has the structure of having three-
sides and consists in nothing more than this, (ii) all triangles have in common three-sidedness and nothing 
more, and (iii) three-sidedness is more fundamental than triangularity. Similarly, consider a reduction of 
shaded squareness to the properties of being shaded and being a square. According to this view of property 
reductions, such a reduction holds that (i) the property of being a shaded square has the structure of being 
shaded and being a square, (ii) all shaded squares have in common the properties of being shaded and being 
a square (and nothing more), and (iii) shadedness and squareness are more fundamental than shaded 
squareness; see Schroeder (2007a, ch. 4, esp. pp. 67-72). 
